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Abstract
In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of
electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty.
We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not
perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep
well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with
future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under
some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards
can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit
to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts
and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty,
measured by economic volatility, is associated to better scal discipline in a panel of 20
OECD countries.
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Governments of democratic countries are often criticised for taking myopic actions. Ex-
amples of a short-term bias in policymaking abound, ranging from the ease with which public
debt is accumulated and the di¢ culty in cutting it down, to widely-raised concerns about un-
derinvestment in long-term policies such as education, environmental conservation and basic
research. Measures of political myopia also vary signicantly across countries and time, hence
the importance of studying what conditions make it more or less likley. Economists and political
scientists alike have long been intrigued by the idea that elections, while providing a fundamen-
tal mechanism of accountability, may at the same time induce a short-term bias (e.g., Nordhaus,
1975; see Eslava, 2011 for a recent survey). Studying how political institutions cope with these
sometimes conicting goals is therefore one of the major questions in political economy.
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of
electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty.
Consistently with the conventional wisdom, we nd that politicians have too weak incentives to
take actions and invest in policies with future returns. Di¤erently from most of the literature,
however, we nd that various forms of uncertainty can alleviate this short-term bias and some-
times increase social welfare. We then examine the implications of our results for the design of
optimal political institutions.
Combining the political setup in Rogo¤ (1990) with the agency model in Holmstrom (1999),
we study the choice of o¢ ce-motivated politicians to exert e¤ort and to invest in long-term
policies with future benets. Politicians di¤er solely in ability and elections serve the purpose
of ousting those who perform poorly. This selection ex-post shapes political incentives ex-ante:
by exerting more e¤ort and investing less, the incumbent can improve current performance
in an attempt to signal high ability and therefore increase his reelection probability. Such
an opportunistic short-term bias holds even when citizens are rational and aware of political
strategies under two conditions. The rst is that ability of politicians is initially unknown, so
that it must be inferred on the basis of performance. The second is an informational asymmetry
between citizens and the incumbent such that e¤ort and resources invested in long-term policies
are not directly observed by voters.1 Since citizens cannot disentangle the e¤ect of ability from
policy choices, there is a signal-jamming motive to inate current performance at the expenses of
1Following Holmstrom (1999) and di¤erently from Rogo¤ (1990), we assume that ability is initially unknown
even to the politician. This implies that we consider a moral-hazard model, which is more tractable than signalling
games.
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the future. Despite this, however, in a rational-expectation equilibrium voters correctly foresee
the strategy of the incumbent so that they will not be fooled. As a result, the incumbent will not
be able to manipulate his reelction probability. Still, his choice to underinvest is sustained by
hidden information out of equilibrium: the fact that he can deviate from his optimal strategy in
ways unknown to voters. In other words, the incumbent is trapped in an ine¢ cient equilibrium
where he is expected to behave myopically and from which he cannot escape for fear of losing
o¢ ce.2
Contrary to many existing works, we nd that in our setting uncertainty is likely to make
investment in long-term policies more viable. The reason for this result is that the short-run
bias depends crucially on the sources of uncertainty a¤ecting the precision of the signal that
voters can see. If observable measures of performance are poor signals of ability, for instance
because the economy is going through a period of high turbulence, the probability of being
reelected becomes less sensitive to the choices of the politician, thereby lowering the temptation
to engage in signal jamming. Similarly, the action of the politician matters less for reelection
when political ability is very dispersed. Thus, more uncertainty about outcomes or ability re-
duces unambiguously the level of political myopia. Despite these benecial e¤ects, the welfare
consequences are ambiguous because uncertainty worsens both electoral accountability, thereby
inducing the incumbent to put less e¤ort, and in some cases selection of politicians. By com-
paring these contrasting forces, we nd a simple condition for welfare to increase or decrease
with various forms of uncertainty.
The high tractability of our model allows us to also address two normative questions. First,
we study the e¤ect of political rewards on social welfare. By increasing the value to stay in
power, higher rewards exacerbate underinvestment, but also induce the incumbent to exert more
e¤ort. We characterise the socially optimal level of compensation arising from this trade-o¤
and nd that politicians should be rewarded more when e¤ort is relatively more important than
long-term policies and when uncertainty is high. Second, since political myopia arises because
incumbents care about reelection, we ask under what conditions imposing a one-term limit may
be welfare improving. A term limit promotes investment, but reduces political accountability
2The model is therefore consistent with the view that governments are worried by the electoral cost of long-
term policies. As Jean-Claude Juncker once said, We all know what to do, but we dont know how to get
reelected once we have done it. It also shows that this view is fully consistent with the evidence that myopic
policies do not seem to be rewarded by voters.
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and hence e¤ort, and gives up the benet of selection. We nd that it may be welfare improving
only when political rents from o¢ ce are high, and when long-term policies are relatively more
important than e¤ort and selection.
We then consider some extensions aimed at studying the sensitivity of the results to various
aspects of our model. A crucial assumption is that voters cannot perfectly observe political ac-
tions, or that an incumbent can take hidden actions which shift upward current performance at
the expenses of future outcomes. This information structure, which is used in several other mod-
els (e.g., Rogo¤ 1990, Alesina and Tabellini, 2007, 2008, Ponzetto and Troiano, 2012), appears
plausible whenever it is costly for an individual to monitor precisely a governments behaviour.
For instance, policies that are di¢ cult to observe ex-ante may include o¤-budget expenditures,
loans and guarantees, vesting of public pension funds or more broadly the allocation of e¤ort
between projects with di¤erent time horizons. Interestingly, even if monitoring were possible,
there may be little incentive to undertake it, or to trust external sources of information, since
the equilibrium choice of policies is anyway anticipated by rational voters. We explore these
possibilities by showing that our results still apply when voters can observe, albeit imperfectly,
political actions. Under some conditions, this additional information turns out to be irrelevant,
while in other instances it may indeed alleviate political myopia. Finally, to better understand
the role of the time horizon of payo¤s for political incentives, we extend the model by adding
another policy choice with contemporaneous costs and benets. We show that, for this type of
short-term policies, electoral incetives can lead to the socially optimal outcome.
Our paper builds on agency models where the role of elections is to select the most competent
politician. In this setting, incumbent policymakers have career concerns, i.e., they have implicit
incentives to perform well to appear talented to voters. Models of this type have been originally
developed to study labor-market relationships, where an agent seeks to maximise a principals
perception of his competence (Holmström, 1999, Dewatripont et al., 1999a, 1999b). This ap-
proach has been applied to politics by Persson and Tabellini (2000), Alesina and Tabellini (2007,
2008) among others. The distinctive feature of these applications is that instruments to provide
incentives in politics are much coarser than those available to rms, as they often limit to a
retain-or-re decision. Incumbent politicians want to maximise the probability of reelection,
rather than expected competence, with sometimes di¤erent implications. Our contribution is to
extend this analysis by studying the electoral incentives on actions with di¤erent time proles
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of costs and benets, how they are a¤ected by various forms of uncertainty, and to explore some
normative implications for the design of political institutions.
Consistently with the agency literature, we nd that career concers (or signal-jamming in-
centives) can be benecial, but also detrimental. As in Holmström (1999), they have a benecial
disciplining e¤ect on short-run actions, such as putting e¤ort or refraining from rent seeking, a
result that goes back to Barro (1973). But they may also induce myopia.3 In the latter case, ca-
reer concerns pose a trade-o¤ between selection and e¢ ciency which seems particularly relevant
in politics. In a similar vein, Dewan and Myatt (2007, 2010, 2012) study the incentives faced
by ministers in a government where they can only be red or promoted and the implications
of this reward scheme for the performance and longevity of the government. They also nd a
trade-o¤ between performance and selection, and study how feedback e¤ects between perfor-
mance and longevity may lead to multiple equilibria and rich dynamics, such as honeymoon
e¤ects, turning points, and sudden crises of condence. The e¤ect of political rewards on the
quality of politicians has also been studied, among others, by Caselli and Morelli (2004), Besley
(2004), Besley and Smart (2007), and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008). Contrary to our model, all
these papers do not focus explicitly on the role of uncertainty and the time horizon of policies.
Models of political myopia have been proposed to study why budget decits arise and why
they are so di¢ cult to eliminate. A short-term bias may result from the strategic interaction
of di¤erent policymakers who do not fully internalise future costs and/or manipluate public
debt to inuence each others (e.g., Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, Persson and Svensson, 1989).
In these models, political myopia is a function of political instability, i.e., the probability that
a party in power loses o¢ ce. On the contrary, in our model what matters is not so much the
reelection probability, but rather the incentive to manipulate it. Inuential models of delayed
stabilisations have been built on the idea that uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains
and losses may lead to a status quo bias (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, Ciccone, 2004) or a war
of attrition (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Di¤erently from our paper, these results are based on
conict of interests and tend to suggest that uncertainty induces myopic policies, rather than
alleviating them. We show that agency considerations alone may suggest the opposite result.
3Other instances in which career concerns can hurt the principal include when they induce an agent to choose
an action not because it is right for society, but because it is popular (pandering, as in Maskin and Tirole, 2004)
or because it is what an able agent is expected to do a priori (conformism, as in Prat, 2005). The fact that
career concerns may induce myopia has been recognised by Stein (1989), although in a very di¤erent application
to stock markets.
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Finally, our paper is also related to models of political business cycles, where incumbents
want to perform well just before elections so as to appear talented (e.g. see Nordhaus, 1975,
Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988, Rogo¤, 1990, Lohman, 1998, Drazen, 2000, Shi and Svensson, 2006).
We move beyond this literature by exploring the broader determinants of political myopia,
particularly uncertainty, the trade-o¤s that electoral incentives may pose and the resulting
normative implications. Interestingly, our results may suggest the existence of a novel trade-o¤
between political and business cycles, in that an increase in the variance of economic shocks
discourages pre-electoral signal jamming. The focus of our paper, however, is not to study how
political incentives vary in election and non-election years.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the empirical observations
motivating our analysis. It reviews the existing evidence on the relationship between elections,
scal disipline and economic outcomes. It also unveils a new pattern in the data: in a panel
of OECD countries, periods of high economic volatility are associated to more scal discipline.
Section 2 builds an agency model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and
uncertainty, whereby political myopia arises from the desire of incumbents to improve current
performance in an attempt to be reelected. It then shows that uncertainty, by weakening the
impact of signal jamming on reelection probability, alleviates myopia but worsens political
accountability. Section 3 examines some normative implications of the model. It provides
conditions for uncertainty to be welfare improving, it shows how political rewards can be set so
as to maximise social welfare and studies the desirability of imposing a one-term limit. Section
4 explores the robustness of the main results to alternative assumptions on information and on
the timing of costs and benets of alternative policies. Section 5 concludes.
1 Motivating Evidence
The vast literature on electoral incentives and short-sighted policies has documented a number
of empirical regularities. We summarise here those that seem particularly relevant for our paper
and we then present some novel ndings. First, while economic performance often a¤ects the
probability that politicians stay in power, myopic policies such as loose scal discipline do not.
Second, pre-electoral budget manipulation is more likely to occur in countries where monitoring
is more di¢ cult, while scal discipline is more likely to occur during times of crisis. Finally, since
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the literature has not explored the link between uncertainty and myopic policies, we provide
some original evidence suggesting that aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility,
is associated to more scal discipline in a panel of OECD countries.
1.1 Elections, Economic Performance and Fiscal Policy
A rst set of questions addressed in the literature is whether economic performance and scal
policies have an impact on reelection probability. The hypothesis that votes depend on economic
outcomes received early support in the works of Fair (1978, 2008), Kiewiet and Rivers (1985)
and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). More recently, Brender and Drazen (2008) show on a sample
of 74 countries that high growth during the term in o¢ ce increases the reelection probability,
particularly in less developed countries. Using a sample of 21 OECD countries, Buti et al.
(2010) nd that high levels and growth rates of GDP have a positive impact on the chances of
reelection for incumbent governments. Wolfers (2007) provides evidence from U.S. gubernatorial
elections that good economic performance increases the likelihood that incumbent parties stay
in o¢ ce. On the contrary, many papers have failed to identify empirically a signicant e¤ect
of scal policies on the chance of reelection. Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina et al. (2010)
study the political consequences of scal adjustments in a cross section and a panel of OECD
countries and nd that scal austerity has positive or no political e¤ects. Brender and Drazen
(2008) nd that loose scal policies have a negative e¤ect on the probability of reelection in a
panel of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. Peltzman (1992), Brender (2003), and Drazen
and Eslava (2010) examine the e¤ect of scal performance on reelection at the state and local
level in a single country (the United States, Israel, and Colombia, respectively) and nd that
voters sometimes punish rather than reward loose scal policies.
A second set of questions concerns the e¤ects of elections and other variables on scal disci-
pline. Several papers have tested whether increases in scal decits and government spending
are more likely during election years. While the results are sometimes mixed and vary by coun-
try, the empirical literature seems to suggest that political budget cycles take place mainly
where voters cannot e¤ectively monitor scal policies (see, in particular, Shi and Svensson,
2006). More broadly, several papers have found that more political cohesion is related to more
scal discipline (e.g., Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002, and other references in Eslava, 2011).
Regarding the adoption of measures aimed at reducing government decits, the literature on
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delayed stabilisations suggests that these policies are more likely in periods of crisis, when new
governments take o¢ ce and when governments are strong (e.g., Alesina et al., 2006). Al-
though economic conditions are found to matter, there is to our knowledge no evidence on
the relationship between scal discipline and economic uncertainty. The fact that crisis and
volatility are typically correlated raises the question of whether part of the e¤ect of economic
downturns on political discipline may work through the higher turmoil that they usually bring
about. We now provide some preliminary evidence on this hypothesis.
1.2 Economic Volatility and Fiscal Discipline
We study how aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is empirically related to
scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries observed annually between 1975 and 2000.4
Following the previous literature, we proxy scal discipline with the annual change in the central
government decit as a ratio of GDP (DEFICIT, from the IMF Government Finance Statistics,
2001). As a measure of macroeconomic volatility, we take the standard deviation of the output
gap, i.e., the di¤erence between actual and potential GDP over potential GDP, as computed by
the OECD based on estimations of the production functions. This variable is meant to capture
unexpected variations in economic performance.
In particular, we estimate:
DEFICITit = DEFICITit 1 + 1SDit 1;t 5 + 2Xit 1 + it; (1)
where DEFICITit is the decit to GDP ratio in country i and year t,  stands for the annual
change between year t   1 and t, SDit 1;t 5 is the standard deviation of the output gap over
the ve-year period between t   5 and t   1, Xit 1 is a vector of control variables and it is
the error term. Following the literature on scal stabilisations (e.g., Alesina et al., 2006), we
include among the controls indicators of economic activity such as the output gap and the
growth rate of real GDP per capita, to account for the cycle, and a dummy for scal crises,
dened as episodes in which government decit as a share of GDP is above the 20th percentile
(i.e., over 7.5 per cent). Finally, we also control for the following political dummy variables
4These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States.
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obtained from the 2006 release of the Database of Political Institutions compiled by the World
Bank: left-wing governments (left), governments in the rst two years of o¢ ce (younggov) and
election years. All regressors are lagged one period to account for the fact that policies may be
decided the year before they are enacted, and to avoid simultaneity. A coe¢ cient 1 < 0 means
that an increase in volatility is associated with a reduction in the decit, which may indicate
less myopic policies.
We initially treat the error as a random e¤ect and estimate the coe¢ cients using both cross-
country and time-series variation. The results are reported in Table 1. The rst specication
suggests that countries with higher volatility and larger decits tend to implement stronger
scal adjustments. Since both variables are signicant, we keep them in the estimation and
add other covariates in the following regressions. First, we control for the output gap and the
growth rate of real GDP per capita. The negative coe¢ cient of the output gap, in column 2,
suggests that countries above potential have better scal discipline, while column 3 conrms
that economic crises (negative output growth) may trigger scal adjustments. In column 4,
we replace economic performance with the indicator of scal crisis and nd a signicant and
negative coe¢ cient, conrming the existing evidence that scal adjustments tend to follow scal
crises. When we consider both economic performance and decit crises, in columns 5 and 6,
all covariates remain signicant. Finally, columns 7 and 8 show that political factors such as
the proximity of an election, ideology and the tenure of the government are not signicantly
correlated with variations in the decit. The sign, magnitude and signicance of the coe¢ cient
for economic volatility remain unaltered.
Next, since the R-squared in Table 1 suggest that time-series variation has more explanatory
power, we include country xed e¤ects in the estimation of (1). In this case, however, OLS
estimates may su¤er from inconsistency due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable
on the right-hand side. We address this problem by implementing the Kiviet (1995) correction
of the standard errors, which requires us to re-write the estimation equation as:
DEFICITit = eDEFICITit 1 + 1SDit 1;t 5 + 2Xit 1 + i + it; (2)
with e =    1.5 In this case, e < 1 would imply that higher decit to GDP ratios are
5Adopting the Blundell and Bond (1998) approach to dynamic panel yields similar estimates. The relatively
large time-series and reduced cross-sectional dimensions, however, cause serious problems of over-tting, which
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followed by larger scal adjustments. Table 2 reports the estimated coe¢ cients with robust
and consistent standard errors under alternative specications of equation (2). The estimates
for lagged DEFICIT in the rst row, signicant and smaller than one, conrm the result that
countries with larger decits tend to implement stronger adjustments. The coe¢ cients for the
standard deviation of the output gap in the second row, negative and signicant, conrm the
evidence in Table 1 that an increase in economic volatility is followed by a stronger reduction
in decits. Quantitatively, the e¤ects are substantial: a one per cent increase in SD from its
average (1.85 per cent) is followed by a 0.35 percentage points reduction in the decit/GDP
ratio. For the average country, this means a shift from a 0.2 percentage points increase to a
0.15 percentage points fall in decit over GDP. When controlling for the output gap, we do
not nd a signicant estimate for this variable. The positive and signicant coe¢ cients for the
growth rate of real GDP per capita in columns 3, 5 and 7, conrm instead the result that bad
economic performance tends to be followed by decit reductions. The result that scal crises are
conducive to better scal discipline is also conrmed by the negative and signicant coe¢ cients
of columns 4-8.
Motivated by these observations, we now present a model where electoral outcomes depend
on economic shocks rather than opportunistic policies and that can shed light on why volatility
may alleviate political myopia.
2 A Model of Politicians, Elections and Myopia
We study an agency model of political accountability through elections with two time periods.
In the rst period, a politician of unknown ability makes decisions about e¤ort and investment
in long-term policies with returns in the second period. Between periods, there is an election
in which voters choose between the incumbent and a challenger. Elections serve the purpose of
ousting bad performing politicians. However, this selection ex-post also a¤ects the incentives the
incumbent faces ex-ante. We use this model to study the determinants of political myopia, i.e.,
the incentive to underinvest in long-term policies in an attempt to manipulate votersbelieves
about ability, with a particular focus on the role of uncertainty.
induced us not to report these results.
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2.1 Preferences and Technology
The economy is populated by a unit measure of risk-neutral agents which live for two periods
and discount the future at rate  2 (0; 1]. Expected utility of the representative citizen is given
by
W = E [yt + yt+1] ; (3)
where yt is a suitable measure of performance (e.g., disposable income per capita, or even
broader measures) in period t, which in turn depends on the actions of a politician. In the
rst period, a citizen is drawn at random to conduct economic policy, and for this he receives
a reward  > 0 for each period in o¢ ce. His expected utility is
U = E [yt + yt+1] +    a
2
2
+ p; (4)
where a2=2 is the cost of exerting e¤ort a and p is his perceived probability of being reelected
in the second period. Thus, the incumbent cares about both social welfare, W , and his own
private costs and benets.6
Performance in the two periods, yt and yt+1, depends on the ability of the politician in o¢ ce,
t, his choice of long-term policies, i, and e¤ort, a, and a random shock "t:
yt = t + a  i+ "t; (5)
yt+1 = t+1 + f (i) + "t+1:
Investing in long-term policies, i, has a cost in terms of current performance and a future
return, where the return function f (i) is assumed to be increasing, concave and three-times
di¤erentiable with f 0 (0) = 1 and f 0 (1) = 0.7 From now on, we refer to i as investment
or long-term policies interchangeably. The social value of e¤ort is parameterised by   0.
To focus on the interesting choice variables only, we disregard e¤ort in the second period,
although it would be straightforward to include. Ability of the politician in o¢ ce at time t, t,
is unknown both to the citizens and to the incumbent, but it is drawn from a known distribution
6A quadratic cost of e¤ort is chosen for tractability. Any increasing and convex cost function would yield
similar results. Alternatively, the model can be rewritten in terms of rent extraction instead of e¤ort by dening
a =  r where r > 0 are rents and v (r) (with v0 (r) > 0 and v00 (r) < 0) is the private utility from rents.
7Alternatively, we could have assumed that the incumbent can a take an hidden actions which shift upward
current performance, but with a convex cost in period two.
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  N  ; 2.8 Finally, "t is an i.i.d. shock drawn from a known distribution "  N  0; 2" and
uncorrelated to ability (E ["] = 0).
The agency game between the citizens and the politician can be summarised as follows.
The politician chooses i and a before observing the realisation of t and "t, so as to maximise
his payo¤ (4). After observing yt only, citizens decide whether to keep the incumbent at t + 1
or to replace him with a new random draw, so as to maximise (3). There are two important
asymmetries between the incumbent and the society at large. First, the politician cares about
social welfare,W , but also about his probability to stay in o¢ ce, with a weight equal to  on the
latter goal. Second, citizens only observe yt and not the actual actions of the politician, i and a.
This informational asymmetry can be justied on the ground that monitoring perfectly e¤ort,
but also policies with future returns, is likely to be di¢ cult. Moreover, it may be hard to observe
the e¤ort the politician puts in implementing di¤erent policies. Nonetheless, in Section 4 we
consider the more general case in which all political choices can be observed, albeit imperfectly.
2.2 Voters
We solve the model backward. First, we nd the election rule chosen by citizens and then we
solve for the investment and e¤ort by the incumbent. Voters face an inference problem: they
want to reelect a politician with a high , but they only observe a noisy signal, yt = t+a i+"t.
Thus, they must form expectations on the ability of the incumbent conditional on yt. Citizens
know the distributions of  and ", and they can foresee the equilibrium level of investment and
e¤ort that the politician will choose, ie and ae respectively (to be solved in the next section).
Given this information, as in a standard signal-extraction problem, the posterior belief on the
incumbents political ability is:
bt = E [t j yt] = 2"
2 + 
2
"
 +
2
2 + 
2
"
(yt   ae + ie) : (6)
That is, the posterior expectation is a weighted average of the prior, , and the observed signal,
yt   aet + ie, with weights that depend on the precision of the signal: as the variance of noise
increases relative to the variance of ability, the signal becomes less and less informative and the
8The assumption that ability is initially unknown even to the politician simplies the model by making all
incuments ex-ante identical. This assumption can be relaxed following the analysis in Banks and Sundaram
(1998).
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posterior expectation converges to the unconditional mean.
Given (6), it is optimal to reelect the incumbent if the belief of his ability is above average,bt  , that is if yt  y, with
y =  + ae   ie: (7)
Thus, the election rule takes a simple threshold form: voters support the incumbent if current
performance exceeds a critical level. To nd ie and ae, we now turn to the optimisation problem
of the politician.
2.3 Politicians
The incumbent chooses investment, i, and e¤ort, a, so as to maximise his expected utility (4),
given the voting strategy of citizens and his information set. Hence, given that E [t] =  and
E ["] = 0, his problem is:
max
fi;ag

   i+ a  a
2
2
+  +  [Et+1 + f (i) + p]

(8)
subject to:
p = Pr (yt  y) = Pr ( + a  i+ "t  y)
= 1 G (y + i  a) ; (9)
where G () is the c.d.f. of the realisation ( + "t), which is normally distributed with mean 
and variance 2" + 
2
, and density g ().
Note that p is a decreasing function of investment and an increasing function of e¤ort:
@p
@i
=  g (y + i  a) < 0 (10)
@p
@a
= g (y + i  a) > 0: (11)
That is, a marginal increase in i lowers the observed realisation of yt and thus the probability
to meet the threshold for reelection. Similarly, a marginal increase in a raises the observed
realisation of yt and thus the expected probability of being reelected. Note also that, by distort-
ing the signal, investment and e¤ort may also a¤ect Et+1. However, it turns out that in the
13
rational-expectation equilibrium the election rule maximises Et+1 given the choice of i and a.
Therefore, an envelope argument guarantees that @Et+1=@i = @Et+1=@a = 0. For this reason
and to simplify the notation, we use this equilibrium result to disregard the terms @Et+1=@i
and @Et+1=@a in the rst-order conditions.
The choice of i must satisfy the following equation:
f 0 (i) = 1  @p
@i
: (12)
The left-hand side of (12) represents the marginal benet of long-term policies, equal to the
discounted marginal product of i. The right-hand side is the marginal cost, which has two
components. The rst one is the social cost of i due to foregone resources today. The second
component, instead, is the private cost of long-term policies: by investing more for the future,
the policymaker worsens current performance and hence his probability to be reelected. This
cost to the politician is proportional to the discounted value of staying in o¢ ce, .
The rst-order condition for e¤ort is instead:
a = +
@p
@a
: (13)
That is, the marginal cost of e¤ort is equalised to the marginal social value, , plus the marginal
private benet due to a higher probability of being reelected. The latter term captures the
disciplining role of elections.
2.4 Equilibrium Policies and Political Selection
In the rational-expectation equilibrium, citizens correctly predict investment and e¤ort so that
we can impose i = ie and a = ae. Thus, (10) and (11) become:
 @p
@i
=
1

@p
@a
= g
 

  g = [2(2 + 2")] 1=2; (14)
because G  N  ; 2 + 2". Policies satisfy:
f 0 (i) = 1 + g (15)
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and
a =  (1 + g) : (16)
What are the equilibrium determinants of long-term investment and e¤ort? The next Propo-
sition answers this question by showing the comparative statics of the choice of i and a to changes
in the main parameters: the degree of uncertainty, coming from the random ability draw ()
and the noise shock ("), and the value of staying in o¢ ce ().
Proposition 1 The equilibrium investment in long-term policies is increasing in the variance
of both noise (2") and ability (
2
), and it is decreasing in the level of political compensation
():
@i
@2"
> 0;
@i
@2
> 0;
@i
@
< 0:
The equilibrium level of e¤ort is decreasing in the variance of both noise (2") and ability (
2
),
and it is increasing in the level of political compensation ():
@a
@2"
< 0;
@a
@2
< 0;
@a
@
> 0:
Proof. See Appendix
The rst notable result is that uncertainty promotes long-term policies by lowering their
electoral cost, g. To see why, recall that incumbents are reluctant to embark in policies with
future payo¤s because they are afraid that their immediate cost may be interpreted by voters
as a sign of low ability. However, when ability and shocks are highly dispersed, the reelection
probability depends more on the realisation of  and ", rather than on the choice of i. Formally,
from (14), g decreases as 2" and 
2
 rise:
@g
@2"
=
@g
@2
=   g
2(2 + 
2
")
: (17)
It follows that there is a lower incentive to inate current performance at the expenses of future
performance when
 
2" + 
2


is high. On the contrary, for a given g, a high value of being in
o¢ ce, , means that the incumbent cares more about reelection and this increases his private
cost of long-term policies. Note also that there is an interesting interaction between these e¤ects
in that the impact of uncertainty is strong when the reward at stake is high and the impact of
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 is strong when uncertainty is low.
The e¤ect of uncertainty on e¤ort is precisely the opposite. By the same reasoning as above,
when uncertainty is high the marginal e¤ect of an extra unit of e¤ort on the probability of
being reelected is small. For a given g, instead, a high value of being in o¢ ce, , increases the
perceived value of e¤ort. Thus, more uncertainty (2 and 
2
") and a lower stake () reduce the
disciplining e¤ect of elections and the equilibrium e¤ort.
Imposing i = ie and a = ae into (7) and then using (9), the reelection probability turns out
to be
p = Pr
 
t + "t  

=
1
2
;
which is just the unconditional probability that the incumbent be more able than the popu-
lation average. Thus, in equilibrium the choice of investment does not a¤ect the probability of
reelection. Yet, what drives the electoral cost of long-term policies (i.e., @p=@i < 0 in (12)) is
hidden information out of equilibrium: the fact that politicians can deviate from their equilib-
rium strategy in ways unknown to voters. Note also that this e¤ect would disappear if there
were no uncertainty about .
Finally, we can solve for Et+1, i.e., the ex-ante expected ability of the politician in o¢ ce
in the second period, given the equilibrium behaviour of voters and the incumbent. With
probability (1  p), the politician will be a new draw with expected ability . With probability
p, it will instead be an incumbent who, by virtue of the voting strategy, is expected to be better
than the average. Hence:
Et+1 = (1  p)  + pE

t+1 j bt   =  + 
2
; (18)
where  represents the selection e¤ect, that is, the di¤erence between the ex-ante expected
ability of a reelected incumbent and the average. This is equal to the average of the posterior
belief truncated from below at , minus the unconditional mean.9 Using standard properties of
normal distributions yields:
 =
22q 
2 + 
2
"

2
= 22g: (19)
Note that reelected politicians tend to be better than the average and more so when ability is
9Note that the distribution of the posterior belief is normal with mean  and variance 4=
 
2 + 
2
"

.
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highly dispersed (there is no benet from selection if politicians are all alike) and when noise is
low (so that it is less likely to reelect bad but lucky politicians).
3 Welfare Analysis
We now explore the implications of the model for social welfare. To start with, we compare
the equilibrium derived above with a constrained-e¢ cient benchmark and show that politicians
choose a suboptimally low level of investment, which we interpret as political myopia. Then, we
examine the impact of uncertainty on welfare and derive conditions for the e¤ect to be positive.
We also study the e¤ect of political reward and show how it can be set so as to maximise
the expected utility of citizens. Finally, we use the model to address the role of elections and
whether or not it is socially desirable to impose a one-term limit to the politician in o¢ ce.
Using (3), (5) and (18), expected ex-ante social welfare is:
W =    i+ a+ 

 +

2
+ f (i)

: (20)
where i and a solve (15) and (16), respectively. Note that the utility of the incumbent does
not appear in (20) since the politician in power is assumed to be innitesimal. This simple
welfare criterion, adopted in many papers including Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008), seems
appropriate given that, for our purposes, the government consists of those individuals who are
subject to electoral accountability, arguably a small group in the society.
The equilibrium derived in the previous Section is ine¢ cient. A benevolent social planner
subject to the information set available to agents would choose iFB so as to equate the social
benet to the social cost:
f 0
 
iFB

= 1: (21)
Comparing (21) to (15), it is immediate to see that the politician chooses too little investment.
This short-term bias arises from the fact that, by deviating from the equilibrium strategy, the
incumbent can increase his chance to be reelected. In sum (proof in the text):
Proposition 2 In the above environment, investment in long-term policies, i, is below the level
that would maximise social welfare.
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Note also that W is increasing in a.10
3.1 Uncertainty and Welfare
In the next proposition, we characterise how uncertainty a¤ects ex-ante expected social welfare
(20).
Proposition 3 The e¤ect on social welfare of the variance of noise (2") and of ability (
2
) is
ambiguous:
@W
@2"
> 0()   g
2
f 00 (i)
> 2 + 
2 (22)
@W
@2
> 0() 2 + 22"  
2g
f 00 (i)
> 2 (23)
Proof. See Appendix
The variance of noise (2") has contrasting e¤ects on welfare. First, Proposition 1 shows that
noise promotes investment in long-term policies. Given that these are always suboptimally low,
this e¤ect tends to increase social welfare. Second, Proposition 1 also shows that noise reduces
e¤ort and this tends to lower social welfare. Third, by making luck relatively more important,
a higher noise raises the probability to oust a talented incumbent or to conrm a bad one.
Thus, 2" reduces the selection premium, , and hence social welfare. The rst e¤ect dominates
the other two, so that noise turns out to be welfare improving, when long-term policies are
relatively more important than e¤ort and selection. This is more likely to be the case when
underinvestment is severe (g is high), e¤ort is not very valuable (low ) and ability is very
concentrated (low 2). Given that g ! 0 when 2" ! 1, condition (22) cannot be satised
when 2" is high enough. Thus, welfare declines with noise if noise is su¢ ciently high.
Without additional restrictions, however, welfare can be a highly non-monotonic function of
2". Some examples are reported in Figure 1 for the case f (i) = i
 and a small . The thin solid
line (horizontal) represents the asymptotic level of welfare as 2" !1, i.e., when investment is
10We implicitly assume that any participation constraint for the politician is not binding. If instead we assumed
that the incumbent had a non-zero weight in the social welfare function, then a bounded level of e¤ort would
be socially optimal, since the planner would partly internalise its private cost. The e¤ort choice would still be
suboptimally low as long as the incumbents weight is su¢ ciently low.
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s 2e
low s 2q
mid s 2q
high s 2q
W
Fig. 1. Uncertainty and Welfare
Note: W is computed assuming f(i)=i a under alternative parameterisations, with high (dashed
line), mid (thick solid line) and low (dotted-dashed line) s 2q . The thin solid line is the
asymptote for s 2e ®¥, i.e. d=0, i=i
FB.
optimal but there is no benet from selection. The upper curve displays the relationship between
W and 2" for a high value of 
2
. When ability is very dispersed, selection is so important that
an increase in noise is always welfare reducing, despite its positive e¤ect on i. The bottom
curve corresponds to the opposite scenario in which heterogeneity in ability is very low, so that
selection is not very useful. In this case, welfare increases with uncertainty until 2" becomes very
large (the point at which the curve becomes downward sloping is not shown). An intermediate
example makes the non-monotonicity more evident.
The variance of ability (2) has contrasting welfare e¤ects too. On the one hand, more
dispersion in political ability increases i (Proposition 1) and the selection premium,  (as can
be seen from (19)). These e¤ects tend to increase social welfare. On the other hand, Proposition
1 shows that more heterogeneity reduces e¤ort. The positive welfare e¤ect will dominate when
long-term policies and selection are relatively more important than e¤ort. That is, when g is
high (so that political myopia is severe), e¤ort is not very valuable (low ) and ability is dispersed
(high 2). From (23), it is immediate to see that the positive welfare e¤ect of heterogeneity
must dominate if 2 is su¢ ciently high.
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3.2 Optimal Political Reward
What are the welfare e¤ects of political rewards, ? If rents from o¢ ce increase, the politician
will care more about reelection and this will induce him to exert more e¤ort, but also to
invest less (see Proposition 1).11 The resulting trade-o¤ suggests that there might exist a
socially optimal level of political rewards. This possibility is worth exploring because, although
 includes psychological rents and private benets that may be di¢ cult to control, the pay
to politicians in power can partly be chosen by the society and varies considerably across
countries.12 Thus, we now turn to the analysis of the optimum  and its determinant. To rule
out unrealistic possibilities, we assume that there is an upper bound to e¤ort, a  amax, since
time and attention are subject to physiological limitations.
Di¤erentiating expected social welfare, (20), with respect to  yields:
@W
@
= 
@a
@
+

f 0 (i)  1 @i
@
The rst term is the marginal value of political rewards, MB (): as long as  < max 
(amax=  1) =g, one additional unit increases e¤ort by @a=@, with a value proportional to
. The second term is instead the marginal cost, MC (): an extra unit of  induces myopia
(@i=@ < 0) and the cost of this is proportional to the severity of underinvestment in equilibrium,
[f 0 (i)  1] > 0. Using (15) and (16) and simplifying terms, the rst-order condition for an
interior optimum is:
MB () = 2 =   @i
@
 =MC () : (24)
While MB () is constant, the slope of MC () is formally analysed in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The marginal cost of  is increasing if and only if
f 00 (i)2 > f 000 (i) g:
Proof. See Appendix
11Some evidence that the wage paid to politicians a¤ects their performance is provided, by Besley (2004) for
the U.S., Ferraz and Finan (2009) for Brazil, and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009) for Italy.
12For example, Besley (2004) reports that the US president is paid around $400,000, the British prime minister
$270,000, while the French president $70,000. See Diermeier et al. (2005) for a pioneering attempt at quantifying
and decomposing the returns to a career in the US Congress.
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The condition in Lemma 1 is satised either if f 000 (i) < 0 or when  is su¢ ciently low. In
what follows, we restrict attention to the most interesting case in which this condition is satised
and MB and MC intersect over the relevant range  2 [0; max]. Under this restriction, the
solution, , to (24) is unique and interior. We study the comparative statics of  to changes
in parameters in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The socially optimal political reward,
 =
 2f 00 (i)
g
;
is increasing in the variance of both noise (2") and ability (
2
), and in the value of e¤ort ():
@
@2"
> 0;
@
@2
> 0;
@
@
> 0:
Proof. See Appendix
An increase in uncertainty (due to either ability dispersion or noise) a¤ects the marginal
cost of political compensation while leaving its marginal benet una¤ected. Higher uncertainty
means that chance plays a bigger role in reelection, implying that i becomes less reactive to
. From (24) we see that this reduces the marginal cost of . As a result, optimal political
compensation increases. A higher value of e¤ort, , raises the marginal benet of  while leaving
the marginal cost una¤ected. Therefore, the optimal compensation increases when e¤ort is more
important.
3.3 Term Limit
A fundamental reason why political myopia arises is that incumbents care not only about social
welfare, but also their reelection. Thus, a way to align the long-run incentives of politicians and
those of the society would be to rule out the possibility of reelection by imposing a one-period
term limit. This would set both p and @p=@i to zero and restore the rst-best level of investment.
Yet, without electoral incentives, incumbents put less e¤ort. Moreover, by excluding reelection,
citizens forego the opportunity of retaining well performing candidates.13 Therefore, despite its
13See Besley and Case (1995) for evidence that term limits do appear to a¤ect policy choices. Yet, from their
results it is di¢ cult to sort out the e¤ects on e¤ort and on long-term policies.
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negative e¤ect on long-term policies, the prospect of reelection may be in the interest of the
society.
To see why, notice rst that allowing for reelection is necessarily better than ruling it out
when   . The reason is that with  = 0 elections yield the same i = iFB and a =  as
the term limit, but with a positive selection premium, . Moreover, welfare incrases in  up to
. However, when private rents from o¢ ce are high and beyond the control of the society (e.g.,
when corruption is too high) imposing a constitutional one-term limit might be optimal. We
now explore this possibility formally.
A one-period term limit, implying

i = iFB; a = ;  = 0
	
, is socially optimal if it grants an
ex-ante expected social welfare, W TL, higher than W , i.e., when:
W TL  W = f  iFB  iFB  [f (i)  i]	  
2
+ 2g

> 0:
The rst term in curly brackets, which is always positive, is the gain due to the higher invest-
ment. The second term, instead, is the loss in social welfare for giving up selection and lowering
e¤ort. Rearranging and using (19) yields that the term limit is socially optimal if and only if:

f
 
iFB
  iFB  [f (i)  i] > g  2 + 2 (25)
This condition is more likely to hold when selection is not very useful or e¤ective, e¤ort has low
value and long-term policies are highly needed.
More formally an increase in  raises the righ-hand side of (25) thereby making the optimality
of a term-limit less likely. When  > , as shown above, W falls with . Hence, the term
limit is more desirable when political rents are higher. The e¤ect of uncertainty is instead more
complex.
First, note that 2 and 
2
" do not a¤ectW
TL, but have ambiguous e¤ects onW , as discussed
in Proposition 3. More uncertainty lowers the left-hand side of (25), because it reduces political
myopia (recall, i converges monotonically to iFB as either 2 !1 or 2" !1). This tends to
make a term limit less attractive. Yet, the e¤ect on the right-hand side of (25) may depend on
the source of uncertainty. When there is more political heterogeneity (higher 2) there is more
to gain from ex-post selection, but there is also less e¤ort in an equilibrium with reelections.
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Fig. 2. Uncertainty and Term Limit
Note: W is computed assuming f(i)= i a . The thick solid line plots the (s 2e , s
2
q ) pairs such
that W=W TL.
W > W TL
W < W TL
s 2e
s 2q
The rst e¤ect dominates, so that the right-hand side of (25) increases if:
@

g
 
2 + 
2

@2
> 0() 2 + 22" > 2
Thus, if 2 is su¢ ciently high, a term limit is never optimal.
An increase in 2", instead, worsens selection and lowers the right-hand side of (25). Since it
also lowers the left-hand side, it is unclear whether or not it makes a term limit more attractive.
Despite this ambiguity, it can be shown that, if 2" is high enough, imposing the term limit
cannot be optimal. The reason is that, as 2" !1, W converges to W TL and @W=@2" < 0 (the
latter follows from Proposition 3), implying that W must converge from above. Thus, we must
have W > W TL when noise is su¢ ciently high. We summarise this discussion in the following
Proposition (proof in the text):
Proposition 5 There exists a threshold level of heterogeneity in political ability, b2, such that
for 2 > b2 holding elections (no term limit) is socially optimal. There exists a threshold level
of economic volatility, b2", such that for 2" > b2" holding elections is socially optimal.
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More generally, the desirability of a term limit is depicted in Figure 2 in the space (2"; 
2
).
In the region below the solid line, welfare is higher when a term limit is in place. Clearly, if 2 is
high enough so that selection is su¢ ciently important, a term limit is never optimal. Similarly,
if 2" is high enough, imposing the term limit cannot be optimal either. Moreover, as the gure
shows, depending on parameters, a term limit may be more likely to be optimal for intermediate
values of noise. This happens because, for low 2" selection is very e¤ective and e¤ort is high,
which compensate for political myopia.
4 Robustness and Extensions
We now study the robustness of the main results derived in Section 2 to alternative assumptions.
First, we show that our results can be generalised to a setting where political action is observed,
albeit imperfectly. Next, we study the case in which the incumbent politician can choose, in
addition to e¤ort and public investment, also short-term policies whose costs and benets are
contemporaneous. We show that the reelection motive does not distort these policies and that
all the previous positive and normative results still apply.
4.1 Imperfect Observability of Policies
The assumption that voters cannot observe i and a at all is certainly strong. Yet, the main
results derived so far hold, at least qualitatively, under much weaker conditions. Assume rst
that voters can observe independent signals of i and a, equal to the actual policy choices plus
an additive i.i.d. Normal disturbance. In this case, one may expect that voters would use this
additional information to form expectations on the ability of the incumbent, thereby making
reelection less subject to manipulation. However, at the time of elections voters can do better:
since they know the model, and hence also the strategy of the incumbent, they are able to
predict the equilibrium choice of policies with no error. On the contrary, using the signals of
i and a to form expectations would only add noise to their inference. As a result, voters will
rationally decide to ignore the additional signals and attribute any di¤erence between them and
their rational expectation to the error term.14 This illustrates an important point. Not only
does an individual agent have little incentive to gather information to decide his own vote whose
14This is always possible because the noise shocks have innite support. See also Grossman and Helpman
(2001) for similar results.
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weight is innitesimal, but there is also little incentive to undertake any monitoring activity
and/or to trust other sources of information (unless perfectly reliable), because the equilibrium
choice of policies can be perfectly anticipated.15
Alternatively, we may assume that voters can observe i and a with some probability. In
particular, let  be the probability that the majority of voters (i.e., the median voter) have no
information on political actions.16 This new assumption a¤ects the reelection rule. If voters
are uninformed, they will reappoint the incumbent if yt > y, exactly as before. Informed voters,
however, observe the sum of competence and the noise shock, +"t, and will keep the politician
in o¢ ce if this is higher than . Then, the perceived probability of reelection becomes:
p =  Pr (yt  y) + (1  ) Pr
 
 + "t  

:
Substituting (5) and (7) and rearranging we obtain:
p =
1 + 
2
  G (y + i  a) : (26)
Comparing (26) to (9), it is immediate to see that the marginal e¤ect of changes in i and a on
the chance of reelection is now weighted by the probability that the median voter is uninformed,
. This is intuitive, since informed voters cannot be fooled, even out of equilibrium. As a result,
the incentive to engage in signal jamming is weaker the lower is . The main results of the model,
and particularly equations (15) and (16), still hold after multiplying g by  and the myopic bias
is present as long as  > 0. On the other hand, by reducing the reward to e¤ort, a higher 
will weaken the disciplinig role of elections. In conlclusion, the e¤ect of having more accurate
information on political incentives may crucially depend on the type of information (i.e., lower
2" versus higher ).
4.2 Short-Term vs Long-Term Policies
To better understand the e¤ect of electoral incentives on policies with di¤erent time-horizons,
we now add a new government action that mirrors i but with the sole di¤erence of producing
15Of course, if voters could commit ex-ante to pay attention to the signals of a and i, this would a¤ect the
incentive of the incumbent. However, such a promise would not be credible since there is no form of committing
to any predened voting rule in democratic electoral systems.
16Alternatively, with minor modications to the voting model,  can be interpreted as the fraction of uninformed
voters. See, for example, Shi and Svensson (2006), Ponzetto (2011) and Ponzetto and Troiano (2012).
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immediate payo¤s. More precisely, assume that the policymaker can trasform b units of resources
at time t into h (b) units of yt:
yt = t + a+ h (b)  b  i+ "t (27)
with h0 (b) > 0; h00 (b) < 0 and limb!0 h0 = 1. Note that this policy is di¤erent from e¤ort,
mostly because the cost of e¤ort was assumed to be private (it does not appear in yt). We
still maintain that voters only observe yt, so that the only asymmetry between i and b is when
the returns materialise. Clearly, the socially optimal level of b should satisfy the condition
h0
 
bFB

= 1. Will electoral incentives distort the choice of such a short-term policy?
To answer this question, consider the problem of an incumbent who sets b so as to solve:
max
fi;a;bg
E [yt + yt+1] +    a
2
2
+ p;
where yt is given by (27) and subject to:
p = Pr (yt  y) = 1 G (y + i+ b  h (b)  a) ; (28)
where now y =  + ae   ie   be + h (be). As before, we are interested in studying electoral
incentives during the rst period and hence disregard the choice of b at t + 1. The rst-order
condition for b is
h0 (b) = 1   @p
@b
; (29)
which shows that the government chooses b taking into account both social costs and benets,
but also the e¤ects on the reelection probability (@p=@b). Yet, di¤erentiating (28) with respect
to b,
@p
@b
=  g ()  1  h0 (b) ;
and substituting this into (29), yields h0 (b) = 1. That is, despite the presence of signal-jamming
incentives, the government sets the socially optimal level bFB. This result comes from the fact
that bFB maximises both yt and p. In other words, when choosing policies with immediate
payo¤s, there is no conict between social welfare and private electoral incentives. Given that
short-term policies are always set optimally, the normative results derived in Section 3 still hold.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the determinants of political myopia and its normative implica-
tions in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational
frictions and uncertainty. In our setting, political myopia arises from the desire of incumbents to
improve current performance at the expenses of future outcomes in an attempt to increase their
probability of reelection. The main contributions can be summarised as follows. First, we have
shown how uncertainty is likely to alleviate myopia, but may also worsen political selection and
accountability. Second, by comparing these e¤ects, we have provided conditions for welfare to
increase or decrease with the degree and type of uncertainty. Third, we have used the model to
study how an optimal political reward should trade o¤ the benet of higher e¤ort with the cost
of more myopic incentives. Fourth, we have shown that, despite the short-term bias, holding
elections is better than imposing a one-term limit unless rents form o¢ ce are very large and
heterogeneity in ability is low.
We conclude by mentioning some limitations of our model and possible extensions. Our
framework can be generalised to show how the correlation between long-term policies and re-
election may depend on the information set of agents. If the social cost of long-term policies is
random and it is observed only by the incumbent, then a politician facing a lower than average
cost may be able to invest more and increase current performance at the same time. In this
way, the model could produce a negative correlation between myopic policies and reelection,
as often found in the empirical literature on scal adjustments (e.g., Alesina et al. 1998 and
Brender and Drazen, 2008).
Although our results have been derived in a two-period model, we expect them to hold in an
innite-horizon setup. A simple way to show this would be by assuming that the agency game
between voters and politicians is repeated and that incumbents have a two-term limit. Since a
reelected incumbent and a new politician would face di¤erent incentives, the extended model
could then be used to study the dynamics of learning and the so-called incumbency advantage,
as in Ashworth (2005). Alternatively, one could consider a richer time structure and assume
that ability follows a rst-order moving average process, as in Rogo¤ (1990).
Another limitation of our approach is that it takes uncertainty as exogenous. In many
instances, for example when uncertainty arises from global economic shocks or from a lack
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of transparency rooted in institutions or cultural traits, this is a reasonable approximation.
Yet, some political actions may be aimed precisely at lowering uncertainty, either by means of
economic stabilisation or through improved monitoring and accountability procedures. Allowing
policy makers to a¤ect the degree of uncertainty they are exposed to would add feedback e¤ects
and seems an interesting direction for future research.
The model could also be extended to include the redistributional implications of policies.
For instance, if politicians could target certain groups to bear the cost of their actions, then the
model might imply timid policies whose costs are e¢ ciently shared when uncertainty is low and
bold decisions that are disproportionately costly for political losers when uncertainty is high.
Finally, although we have discussed the empirical support for our theory, including new
evidence on the correlation between economic uncertainty and scal discipline, a formal test of
the models predictions goes beyond the scope of this paper. Some implications that could easily
be taken to the data are that technocrats or governments close to a term limit should be less
myopic, and that more long-term policies should be adopted at the beginning of legislatures.17
Moreover, our theory may also predict less political myopia when reelection campaign is more
focused on social issues or foreign policy rather than performance, or when the electorate is
more polarised along ideological lines, so that it may be harder to swing votes through hidden
actions. To conclude, we hope that our paper will stimulate new empirical investigations on the
underexplored links between uncertainty and myopic electoral incentives.
Alessandra Bonglioli, Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), Barcelona GSE and CEPR
Gino Gancia, CREI, UPF, Barcelona GSE and CEPR
Submitted on the 26th of February 2012
17 Interestingly, Alesina et al. (2006) provide evidence that young governments are more inclined to scal
discipline. List and Sturm (2006) provide evidence that U.S. governors who are closer to their term limit tend
to manipulate less secondary policy issues. Moreover, Conconi et al. (2011) show that electoral proximity makes
U.S. senators more favourable to protectionism, which may also be a manifestation of a myopic bias.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Implicit di¤erentiation of (15) with respect to 2", 
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since marginal returns to reforms are assumed to be decreasing (f 00 (i) < 0).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
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This is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e.,
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Di¤erentiating social welfare (20) w.r.t. 2 yields:
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall:
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This expression is positive if and only if the term in brackets is positive, i.e.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
From:
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it is immediate to see that  is increasing in . To nd the e¤ect of uncertainty, note that:
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for x = "; . Next, di¤erentiate  w.r.t. g:
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under the condition in Lemma 1, which is assumed to be satis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Table 1  
Economic Volatility and Deficit Reduction    
20 OECD Countries, 1975-2000, Panel RE 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DEFICIT -0.141*** -0.127*** -0.149*** -0.234*** -0.220*** -0.234*** -0.216*** -0.229***
 [0.027] [0.029] [0.033] [0.040] [0.048] [0.052] [0.049] [0.052] 
SD -0.191* -0.256** -0.238** -0.201** -0.266** -0.247** -0.244** -0.236** 
 [0.098] [0.116] [0.095] [0.095] [0.111] [0.102] [0.105] [0.100] 
OUTPUTGAP  -0.095**   -0.094**  -0.089**  
  [0.042]   [0.044]  [0.044]  
dlog(GDP)   31.882***   31.533***  31.381***
   [5.530]   [5.553]  [5.440] 
CRISIS_DEF    -1.226*** -1.217** -1.113** -1.158** -1.063* 
    [0.457] [0.488] [0.535] [0.535] [0.573] 
election       0.295 0.157 
       [0.185] [0.189] 
left       0.267 0.161 
       [0.259] [0.224] 
younggov       0.354 0.369* 
       [0.237] [0.209] 
         
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Country-FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
R2 (within) 0.120 0.106 0.232 0.138 0.128 0.248 0.141 0.257 
R2 (between) 0.0492 0.0811 0.278 0.00611 0.0151 0.172 0.00186 0.137 
 
Note. Dependent variable is ΔDEFICIT = annual change in government deficit as a share of GDP. 
Regressors are lagged values of: DEFICIT; SD = standard deviation of the output gap over the previous 
five years; output gap; dlog(GDP) = growth rate of real GDP per capita; CRISIS_DEF = dummy taking 
value 1 if DEFICIT is less than or equal to -7.5; election = dummy for legislative and/or executive 
elections; left = dummy for left-wing governments; younggov = dummy for governments in the first two 
years of office. Regressions are performed with least squares with random effects. Standard errors, in 
brackets, are clustered by country and robust. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. 
 
 
Table 2  
Economic Volatility and Deficit 
20 OECD Countries, 1975-2000, Panel FE 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DEFICIT 0.843*** 0.852*** 0.819*** 0.725*** 0.734*** 0.729*** 0.735*** 0.728***
 [0.0468] [0.047] [0.042] [0.047] [0.048] [0.044] [0.047] [0.044] 
SD  -0.332**  -0.344**  -0.324**  -0.351**  -0.361**  -0.349***  -0.311**  -0.337**
 [0.148] [0.152] [0.136] [0.148] [0.151] [0.136] [0.155] [0.140] 
OUTPUTGAP   -0.024    -0.021   -0.014  
  [0.048]   [0.049]  [0.049]  
dlog(GDP)   0.315***   0.309***  0.308***
   [0.044]   [0.044]  [0.044] 
CRISIS_DEF     -1.317***  -1.311***  -1.022**  -1.241***  -0.982**
    [0.434] [0.446] [0.417] [0.449] [0.418] 
election       0.253 0.130 
       [0.267] [0.246] 
left       0.490* 0.184 
       [0.298] [0.279] 
younggov       0.480* 0.543** 
       [0.294] [0.275] 
         
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 346 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Country-FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within) 0.120 0.120 0.272 0.140 0.248 0.140 0.262 0.155 
R2 (between) 0.0508 0.0542 0.0949 0.0141 0.180 0.0150 0.119 0.00123 
 
Note. Dependent variable is DEFICIT = government deficit as a share of GDP. Regressors are lagged 
values of: DEFICIT; SD = standard deviation of the output gap over the previous five years; output gap; 
dlog(GDP) = growth rate of real GDP per capita; CRISIS_DEF = dummy taking value 1 if DEFICIT is 
less than or equal to -7.5; election = dummy for legislative and/or executive elections; left = dummy for 
left-wing governments; younggov = dummy for governments in the first two years of office. Regressions 
are performed with least squares (LSDV) with country fixed effects. Standard errors, in brackets, are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and consistency with Kiviet (1995) procedure. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. 
 
